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Assessing the Atrocities: Early Indications of
Potential International Crimes Stemming
from the 2017 Rohingya Humanitarian Crisis
RAJIKA L. SHAH*
I. INTRODUCTION
Beginning in August 2017, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya
Muslims, an ethnic and religious minority in Rakhine state of Myanmar
(Burma),1 fled their homes for refugee camps in neighboring
Bangladesh.2 The proximate cause of the sharp increase in displacements
was the Burmese response to an August 25, 2017 attack by Rohingya
militants (the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army or “ARSA”) on police
posts and a military base located in the northern part of Rakhine state,
which resulted in several deaths.3 In the swift and brutal response that
followed, “security forces supported by Buddhist militia launched a
‘clearance operation’” that forced upwards of 300,000 to flee within only
a few weeks.4 As of February 2018, the number of Rohingya refugees in

* Rajika L. Shah, Deputy Director, Center for the Study of Law and Genocide, Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles.
1. Though “Myanmar” is the official name of the country as declared by the ruling military
junta in 1989, and continued use of the word “Burma” after that date was sometimes used in an
expression of solidarity with those protesting against the junta, many people in the country use
both. See, e.g., J.F., Should You Say Myanmar or Burma?, The Economist, (Dec. 20, 2016),
https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2016/12/economist-explains-19.
The
distinction between the two written words is largely a function of the transliteration into a Roman
script and, in recent years, has lost much of its meaning. See id. Accordingly, this article refers to
both Myanmar and Burma interchangeably. No particular meaning or import is intended with
respect to the use of one or another, and none should be implied or construed.
2. See Austin Ramzy, 270,000 Rohingya Have Fled Myanmar, U.N. Says, N.Y. TIMES, (Sept.
8, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2xhknSD.
3. Id.
4. Id.; see also Rebecca Ratcliffe, Who Are the Rohingya and What Is Happening in
Myanmar, THE GUARDIAN, (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/
2017/sep/06/who-are-the-rohingya-and-what-is-happening-in-myanmar.
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Bangladesh was estimated to be at least 700,000 out of the approximately
one million Rohingya who had been living in Myanmar.5
Numerous outlets reported widespread and severe atrocities
committed by Myanmar government forces, in particular from August
through November 2017, which included large-scale coordinated attacks
on Rohingya villages characterized by “massacres, widespread rape,
arbitrary detention, and mass arson.”6 There were reports of landmines
laid near the Burmese-Bangladeshi border by Burmese military, 7
shootings of Rohingya civilians as they fled,8 and the alleged bulldozing
of mass graves in a “deliberate attempt by the authorities to destroy
evidence of potential international crimes, including possible crimes
against humanity.”9
Also surprising to many was the conspicuous lack of strong
leadership from the head of Myanmar’s civilian government, noted
democracy activist and Nobel Peace Prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi. As
the face of more than twenty years of Burmese resistance to the hardline
military junta, many expected that Suu Kyi—who previously endured
imprisonment under house arrest, forced exile, and years of separation
from her husband and son in furtherance of her cause—would be a vocal
supporter of minority rights and the rule of law in Burma. Instead, it
appeared that she was “fearful of the military and reluctant to confront
the human rights crisis unfolding in her own country.”10 In her first public
remarks on the issue, Suu Kyi did not offer the strong denunciation many
had hoped for, but rather downplayed the extent and seriousness of the
violence, perhaps as a calculated response to domestic political
pressures—the Burmese military still wields “considerable political and
economic power” and some experts believe it is the military, acting

5. Ramzy, supra note 2; see also Hannah Beech, Will the Rohingya Ever Return Home? N.Y.
TIMES, (Feb. 15, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2C2zEsw.
6. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2018: EVENTS OF 2017 100 (2018); see also
Ramzy, supra note 2.
7. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 100.
8. See Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, High Comm’r for Human Rights, U.N. Human Rights
Council, Opening Statement before 36th Session (Sept. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Al Hussein Opening
Statement].
9. Stephanie Nebehay & Simon Lewis, ‘Acts of Genocide’ Suspected Against Rohingya in
Myanmar: UN, REUTERS, (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingyarights/acts-of-genocide-suspected-against-rohingya-in-myanmar-u-n-idUSKCN1GJ163 (quoting
U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein).
10. See James Griffiths, Has the Rohingya Crisis ‘Changed’ Myanmar’s Aung San Suu Kyi?,
CNN, (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/26/asia/aung-san-suu-kyi-myanmarrohingya-intl/index.html.
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without civilian oversight, that is primarily to blame.11 Nevertheless, in
recent months, numerous groups and institutions rescinded previous
honors they had awarded Suu Kyi, and many felt she should be stripped
of her Nobel prize.12 Suu Kyi has approached the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (“ASEAN”) for humanitarian and capacitybuilding assistance with respect to the situation in Rakhine.13
The shocking reports prompted U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, to call for the situation to be
referred to the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) for investigation and
potential prosecution.14 He previously cited the reported “killings, rape,
torture and abductions by the security forces and local militia, as well as
apparently deliberate attempts to force the Rohingya to leave the area
through starvation, with officials blocking their access to crops and food
supplies,” in support of his statement that “acts of genocide” may well
have been committed.15 As early as September 2017, even while the
events were still unfolding, Mr. Al Hussein termed the atrocities in
Rakhine a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.”16 The ICC Prosecutor
apparently agreed; on April 9, 2018, she filed a request for a ruling on
jurisdiction with the President of the Pre-Trial division of the Court, on
the basis that she had reviewed “[c]onsistent and credible public reports”
of intentional deportations of Rohingya across Myanmar’s international
border with Bangladesh (as well as multiple other potential crimes).17
11. See, e.g., Rebecca Wright, Katie Hunt & Joshua Berlinger, Aung San Suu Kyi Breaks
Silence on Rohingya, Sparks Storm of Criticism, CNN, (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/
2017/09/18/asia/aung-san-suu-kyi-speech-rohingya/index.html; see also Remarks of Simon
Billenness and Priscilla A. Clapp, Teleconference on The Plight of the Rohingya, sponsored by the
Pacific Council on International Policy (Feb. 7, 2018) (recording available at https://www.
pacificcouncilorg/activities/plight-rohingya).
12. See, e.g., U.S. Holocaust Museum Rescinds Award to Myanmar’s Suu Kyi, REUTERS,
(Mar. 7, 2018) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-myanmar-award/u-s-holocaust-museumrescinds-award-to-myanmars-suu-kyi-idUSKCN1GJ2U0.
13. See Ben Doherty, Aung San Suu Kyi Asks Australia and Asean for Help with Rohingya
Crisis, THE GUARDIAN, (Mar. 18, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/mar/18/aungsan-suu-kyi-asks-australia-and-asean-for-help-with-rohingya-crisis.
14. See Tom Miles & Stephanie Nebehay, U.N. Rights Boss Wants Allegations of Crimes
against Rohingya Referred to ICC, REUTERS, (Mar. 9, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/usmyanmar-rohingya-un/u-n-rights-boss-wants-allegations-of-crimes-against-rohingya-referred-toicc-idUSKCN1GL12B.
15. Nebehay & Lewis, supra note 9.
16. Al Hussein Opening Statement, supra note 8, at 2.
17. See Prosecution’s Request for a Ruling on Jurisdiction under Article 19(3) of the Statute,
ICC-RoC46(3)-01/18-1 (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_
02057.PDF [hereinafter “ICC Prosecution Request”]; see also Reuters, ‘Hallmarks of Genocide’:
ICC Prosecutor Seeks Justice for Rohingya, THE GUARDIAN, (Apr. 10, 2018), https://www.
theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/10/rohingya-crisis-icc-prosecutor-seeks-power-to-investigatecrimes-against-humanity. In the ICC Prosecutor’s view, sufficient evidence existed of deportation
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Although more is now known about the events of autumn 2017 than
reporters and investigators were able to learn contemporaneously, the
Myanmar government denies any wrongdoing and has said it would like
to see “clear evidence” of ethnic cleansing or genocide, in light of its
claim that “[t]he vast majority of the Muslim community that was living
in Rakhine remains.”18
In light of the global attention the situation has received, this short
piece will examine, based on public reporting to date (April 2018),
whether the acts allegedly committed rise to the level of international
crimes; namely, crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes. An
important part of this discussion is the distinction in international law
between ethnic cleansing—the term most commonly applied to the events
in Rakhine in autumn 2017—and genocide. Much more evidence and
information is needed in order to conduct a thorough legal analysis, and
no official investigation has even begun. 19 Thus, though necessarily
preliminary, generalized, and subject to changing facts as they are
discovered, this piece will hopefully shed some light on potential
international criminal law violations and implications arising from these
atrocities.
II. ROOTS OF THE CONFLICT
Violence and atrocities in Rakhine state are not new. Conflict in
Rakhine has been simmering for decades, if not longer, with roots in

as a crime against humanity that she considered it prudent to seek a ruling on the Court’s territorial
jurisdiction before proceeding further. See ICC Prosecutor Request, ¶¶ 3, 7-11 and accompanying
text. Myanmar has not ratified the Rome Statute of the ICC, and thus the question arises as to
whether the ICC has territorial jurisdiction. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
art. 12(2)(a), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter “Rome Statute”] (stating in relevant part
that “the Court may exercise its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this
Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court: (a) The State on the territory of which the
conduct in question occurred”). Because one of the elements of the crime of deportation is the
forced crossing of an international border, the Prosecutor argued that the crime is completed only
when the forced crossing occurs; since that necessarily took place on the territory of Bangladesh,
which is a State Party to the Rome Statute, territorial jurisdiction was thus established. See ICC
Prosecutor Request, ¶¶ 13-14, 28-29. Alternatively, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over any
crime occurring in Myanmar if the situation is referred to the Prosecutor by the UN Security
Council acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. See Rome Statute, art. 13(b).
18. See Tom Miles, Myanmar Says It Would Like to See ‘Clear Evidence’ of Genocide,
REUTERS, (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-rohingya-rights/myanmarsays-it-would-like-to-see-clear-evidence-of-genocide-idUSKCN1GK2JH.
19. See Security Council Urges Conditions That Allow Safe Return of Rohingya Refugees, UN
NEWS, (May 1, 2018), https://news.un.org/en/story/2018/05/1008692 (noting that UN Security
Council members, following a recent visit to Myanmar to assess the situation firsthand, called for
a “proper investigation with evidentiary standards” in order to ensure accountability).
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Burma’s complex web of ethnic, religious, and territorial identities.20
Rakhine state lies on the northwest coast of Myanmar, directly south of
Bangladesh. The Rakhines themselves are an ethnic minority within
Burma, though most are Buddhists, like nearly 90 percent of the Burmese
population.21 The Rohingya are Muslims who claim to be descended from
Arab and Persian traders, and speak Bengali like their neighbors in
Bangladesh.22 When Burma gained independence from the British in
1948, the Muslims living in Rakhine hoped that Pakistan—of which at
that time Bangladesh formed a part, being known as East Pakistan until
achieving independence in 1971—would annex their territory, which did
not happen.23 A subsequent Muslim separatist rebellion continued until
the 1960s, after which time sporadic violence continued.24
The name “Rohingya” did not acquire political significance until
1982, when the military junta ruling Burma passed the Citizenship Law,
restricting citizenship to only eight named groups—including the
Rakhine ethnic group, but not the Rakhine Muslims.25 All others,
including the Rohingya, lost their citizenship overnight and became
stateless.26 Since then, the Rohingya saw their rights steadily eroded,
together with an increase in persecution and violence.27 They are seen as
illegal immigrants, and have been forced to endure severe limitations on
their “freedom of movement, access to medical assistance, [and]
education.”28 Muslim leaders in Rakhine increasingly coalesced around
the term “Rohingya,” both as a way of defining their identity and in order
to bring international attention to their plight.29
Tensions ratcheted up dramatically in 2012, when several Muslim
men were accused of having raped a Buddhist woman.30 In the wake of
the resulting religious violence, more than 100,000 Rohingya were forced
into camps for internally displaced people.31 Another 300,000-500,000

20. See Krishnadev Calamur, The Misunderstood Roots of Burma’s Rohingya Crisis, THE
ATLANTIC, (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/09/
rohingyas-burma/540513/.
21. See id.
22. See id.; Ratcliffe, supra note 4.
23. See Calamur, supra note 20.
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. Ratcliffe, supra note 4.
29. See Calamur, supra note 20.
30. See id.
31. See id.
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fled to refugee camps in Bangladesh and throughout Southeast Asia.32
Although the Burmese government eventually offered a reduced form of
citizenship, it would have required Muslims in Rakhine to register as
Bengalis (ethnically akin to Bangladeshis), rather than Rohingya.33
Recent years have seen a downward spiral of increased Burmese
military and police presence, together with militarism on the part of
Rohingya Muslims.34 The Burmese government and many civilians fear
the Rohingya’s territorial ambitions and are concerned about what they
view as the presence of Muslim terrorist groups on Burmese soil, such as
ARSA, reportedly linked to Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.35 Humanitarian
groups and Western nations, on the other hand, see “the world’s most
persecuted minority.”36 Other nations in the region fear that the instability
in Rakhine will threaten regional peace and security. For example, a 2015
report prepared on behalf of the ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human
Rights found that:
The longstanding persecution of the Rohingya Muslim minority in
Myanmar has led to the highest outflow of asylum seekers by sea since
the U.S. war in Vietnam. Human rights violations against Rohingya
have resulted in a regional human trafficking epidemic, and there have
been further abuses against Rohingya upon their arrival in other
Southeast Asian countries.
This protracted culture of abuse threatens Myanmar’s political
transition, puts strains on regional economies, and supports the rise of
extremist ideologies that pose potential security threats throughout the
region. Ongoing human rights abuses against Rohingya pose a threat
to regional peace and security and must end.
Broader anti-Muslim rhetoric and violence has also flared up in
locations across Myanmar in recent years. These incidents, as well as
ongoing abuses against ethnic minority groups throughout the country,
pose similar risks for Myanmar and the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN).37

This difference in perception has made it difficult to find any
solution for the Rohingya. An international commission chaired by Kofi
32. See Ramzy, supra note 2.
33. See Calamur, supra note 20.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Id.; see also Nicole Phillips & Sonam Sheth, ‘The Most Persecuted Minority in the
World’: Here’s What You Need to Know about the Rohingya Crisis, BUSINESS INSIDER (Sept. 20,
2017), http://www.businessinsider.com/rohingya-crisis-conflict-explained-myanmar-what-youneed-to-know-2017-9.
37. ASEAN PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, THE ROHINGYA CRISIS AND THE
RISK OF ATROCITIES IN MYANMAR: AN ASEAN CHALLENGE AND CALL TO ACTION (2015).
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Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations, issued
recommendations on August 23, 2017—just before the events leading to
the current humanitarian crisis.38 Although Bangladesh and Myanmar
have engaged in several rounds of talks regarding the return of Rohingya
to Myanmar, little action has been taken by either side to implement a
voluntary repatriation scheme agreed upon in November 2017.39 Both
sides blame each other for the inaction.40 Bangladesh continues to work
towards its controversial plan of relegating the Rohingya to an
uninhabited offshore island, in part to relieve domestic political and
economic pressures resulting from the influx of refugees.41 Meanwhile,
the Myanmar military admits no wrongdoing, and it is not clear that the
Rohingya want to return unless they are granted full citizenship rights.42
Grim longhouses constructed by the Myanmar government in Rakhine,
supposedly to house returning Rohingya, have been compared to
concentration camps with their barbed wire fencing, lack of vegetation,
and seemingly no place for the Rohingya to grow food or support
themselves.43
Thus, as of this writing in April 2018, the situation remains a
stalemate—albeit one in which the Rohingya have little choice but to
remain in squalid, overcrowded camps on the Bangladeshi border, soon
to be facing the muddiness and flooding of monsoon season, with little
opportunity for work or adequate food, clothing, or medical care.44
III. POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW VIOLATIONS
Against this backdrop, it is possible to examine—though based on
the limited alleged facts known to date—whether any international
crimes, and if so, which ones, may have been committed in the wave of
violence that began in Rakhine in late August 2017 (though events
occurring prior to that time may also form part of the crimes). There are
three main categories of potentially relevant international crimes:
genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes. Each is discussed
below in turn, highlighting particular aspects that are likely to feature in
38. See Calamur, supra note 20; see also ADVISORY COMM’N ON RAKHINE STATE, TOWARDS
A PEACEFUL, FAIR AND PROSPEROUS FUTURE FOR THE PEOPLE OF RAKHINE (2017).
39. See Beech, supra note 5; see also Security Council Urges Conditions That Allow Safe
Return of Rohingya Refugees, supra note 19.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Reuters, Monsoon Floods and Landslides Threaten 100,000 Rohingya Refugees in
Bangladesh, N.Y. Tɪᴍᴇs, (Mar. 9, 2018), https://nyti.ms/2GgQnYI.
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any full-length analysis. “Ethnic cleansing,” as such, is not recognized as
a defined international crime, although the line between ethnic cleansing
and genocide is indistinct and controversial, and therefore the two
concepts will be discussed together.
A. Genocide and Ethnic Cleansing
The crime of genocide is defined in the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (“Genocide
Convention”), as adopted by the United Nations in 1948 and entered into
force in 1951. According to this definition, genocide is:
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a)Killing members of the group;
(b)Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c)Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d)Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e)Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.45

The same definition of genocide appears in the statutes of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), 46
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR),47 and the ICC.48
With respect to the Rohingya, a few issues stand out. The first is the
identity of the group. One of the unique features of the crime of genocide
is its recognition that the target is not a particular individual, but rather
the group as such: “the individual victim is ‘a means to an end: a step
further along the path of destroying the group.’”49 “The victim of the
crime of genocide is therefore the group itself and not the individual

45. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. II, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. Although Article III of the Genocide
Convention goes on to list five possible modalities for commission of the crime—genocide itself,
conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt to
commit genocide, and complicity in genocide—this short survey will consider only primary
liability for genocide itself. See id. art. III.
46. See U.N. Security Council, Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, art. 4, (Sept. 2009), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20 Library/Statute
/statute_sept09_en.pdf.
47. See U.N. Security Council, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, art.
2, (Jan. 31, 2010), http://unictr.unmict.org/sites/unictr.org/files/legal-library/100131_Statute
_en_fr_0.pdf.
48. See Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 6.
49. CAROLA LINGAAS, DEFINING THE PROTECTED GROUPS OF GENOCIDE THROUGH THE
CASE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS 2 (2015) (citing Int’l Law Comm’n, Draft Code of Crimes,
art. 17, Commentary 6, UN Doc. A/51/10 (2016).
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alone.”50 The drafters of the Genocide Convention ultimately restricted
the definition to only four types of groups: national, ethnic, racial, or
religious. The first judgment of an international criminal tribunal finding
liability for genocide, Prosecutor v. Akayesu,51 took an objective view of
the definitions of each of these four groups. Since then, many sources and
commentators have moved toward a more subjective view of group
identity for purposes of the crime of genocide, in recognition of the fact
that “using objective and scientifically irreproachable criteria would be a
perilous exercise whose result would not necessarily correspond to the
perception of the persons concerned by such categorisation.”52 Thus, the
current prevailing view is that the important determining factor is whether
the victims are “perceived . . . by their persecutors” as belonging to a
particular national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.53 The obvious group
identities at play with respect to the Rohingya appear to be ethnic (they
speak Bengali and are not ethnically Rakhine), religious (they are
Muslims, not Buddhists like the large majority of Burmese people), and
national (the Rohingya were targeted for the removal of citizenship in
Burma’s 1982 Citizenship Law). Most importantly, these are some of the
key characteristics for which they appear to have been targeted.
A second question is whether the actus reus of genocide, the acts
constituting genocide, has been met. Here, with respect to subsection (a)
(killing members of the group), there are numerous reports of
indiscriminate killings of Rohingya villagers while their villages were
being burnt, as they were fleeing the violence, or as the result of
landmines laid along the border with Bangladesh, which the Rohingya
had to cross in order to reach relative safety. 54 There are also reports of
mass graves.55 There cannot be any real dispute that subsection (b)
(causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group) has also
been met—not only as a result of the acts of persecution perpetrated
against the Rohingya, but also and perhaps most clearly through the
widespread rape of Rohingya women by Burmese soldiers. Rape or “any
act of a sexual nature which is committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive . . . [and which] need not be evidenced

50. Id.
51. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998).
52. Prosecutor v. Jelisić, IT-95-10-A, Judgment, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. of the Former
Yugoslavia Dec. 14, 1999).
53. See William Schabas, Genocide, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW ¶ 24 (2007).
54. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 6, at 100; Ramzy, supra note 2.
55. See Nebehay & Lewis, supra note 9.
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by a show of physical force” may constitute a form of genocide when
perpetrated against only individuals of the targeted group.56 That is
because sexual violence can be “a step in the process of destruction of the
[targeted] group—destruction of the spirit, of the will to live, and of life
itself.”57 Tragically, Rohingya women have described systematic and
methodical allegations of rape by Burmese forces acting with total
impunity, often by multiple assailants and in the context of larger assaults
on Rohingya families and villages.58 Finally, subsection (c) (deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part) is demonstrated in the attacks,
looting, and arson of Rohingya villages and agricultural areas that forced
the Rohingya to flee and leave their possessions behind. Though the
Myanmar government has claimed that the Rohingya burned down their
own villages, a BBC reporter witnessed firsthand a group of Rakhine
Buddhists wielding machetes, swords, and slingshots, who admitted they
had just set a Rohingya village on fire with help from the police.59
The third, and here most crucial, question in determining whether a
genocide was committed involves what is known as dolus specialis
(special intent), often referred to as aggravated criminal intent: in order
for the acts to be considered genocide, they must have been not only
intentionally committed, but committed “with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part,” the targeted group. The International Court of Justice (“ICJ”)
elaborated: “It is not enough that the members of the group are targeted
because they belong to that group, that is because the perpetrator has a
discriminatory intent. Something more is required.”60 Contrasting
genocide with persecution as a crime against humanity, the Court stated
that “genocide is an extreme and most inhuman form of persecution
. . . .[W]hen persecution escalates to the extreme form of wilful and
deliberate acts designed to destroy a group or part of a group, it can be

56. Akayesu, ICTR-96-4-T, ¶ 688.
57. Id. ¶ 732.
58. See, e.g., Kristen Gelineau, Rohingya Methodically Raped by Myanmar’s Armed Forces,
AP NEWS (Dec. 11, 2017), https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/rohingya-methodically-rapedmyanmars-armed-forces. The UN Secretary General, António Guterres, highlighted the prevalence
of rape, sexual violence, and forced marriage against the Rohingya in a recent report to the Security
Council. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on Conflict-Related Sexual
Violence, ¶¶ 55-57, U.N. Doc. S/2018/250 (Mar. 23, 2018) [hereinafter “Secretary-General’s
Sexual Violence Report”].
59. See Jonathan Head, BBC Reporter in Rakhine: “A Muslim Village was Burning,” BBC
NEWS (Sept. 7, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41189564.
60. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Rep. 2007 ¶ 187 (Feb. 26).
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held that such persecution amounts to genocide.”61 Moreover, “the intent
must be to destroy at least a substantial part of the particular group”—a
number “significant enough to have an impact on the group as a whole.”62
A requirement of substantiality is inherent in “the very nature of the crime
of genocide.”63
Whether this special intent exists or can be demonstrated is really
the key question in determining whether the Rohingya are victims of
genocide. If the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, cannot be shown,
there is certainly a fairly clear case of ethnic cleansing: “rendering an area
ethnically homogeneous by using force or intimidation to remove persons
of given groups from the area.”64 Though the UN General Assembly has
equated the two, and a Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Summary or
Arbitrary Executions referred to ethnic cleansing as a “euphemism” for
genocide,65 the ICJ carefully stated, “deportation or displacement of the
members of a group, even if effected by force, is not necessarily
equivalent to destruction of that group, nor is such destruction an
automatic consequence of the displacement.”66 While acts described as
ethnic cleansing may constitute genocide, a characterization as genocide
“depends on the presence or absence of acts listed in Article II of the
Genocide Convention, and on the intent to destroy the group as such.” 67
Thus, it can be said that ethnic cleansing is really about territory and “the
establishment of ethnically homogenous lands,” while genocide is about
“the physical-biological destruction of an ethnic, racial, or religious
group.”68
Yet, ethnic cleansing is not considered an international crime in and
of itself, and there is some ambiguity in both its definition and
application, though it has “been filled with legal meaning.”69 The term
“ethnic cleansing” first came into use in the early 1990s in the context of
the conflict in the Balkans, but since then has been more broadly applied

61. Id. ¶ 188 (quoting Prosecutor v. Kupreškić, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 14, 2000)).
62. Id. ¶ 198.
63. Id.
64. Id. ¶ 190 (citing the Interim Report by the United Nations Commission of Experts, ¶ 55,
U.N. Doc. S/35374 (1993)).
65. See Robin Geiß, Ethnic Cleansing, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW ¶ 26 (2013) (citations omitted).
66. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, supra note 60, ¶ 190 at 84.
67. Id.
68. Geiß, supra note 65, ¶ 30.
69. Id. ¶ 36.
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to a number of situations around the world.70 It has been referenced in
multiple UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, and
was included together with genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes within the scope of the responsibility to protect.71 It is clear that
the acts constituting ethnic cleansing—ethnic and/or religious
discrimination, forced population transfer, a wide range of “violent and
terror-inspiring means that may potentially be used to . . . compel flight
or to enforce transfer of the target group” such as arbitrary arrest and
detention, extra-judicial executions, rape and sexual assaults, forcible
removal, displacement and deportation, deliberate military attacks or
threats of attacks on civilians and civilian areas, and wanton destruction
of property—constitute serious violations of international human rights
law, international criminal law, and (if committed in the context of an
armed conflict) the law of armed conflict or international humanitarian
law.72
In view of these parameters, it seems—at least with the present state
of public reporting—that a potential prosecutor would be on solid footing
to bring charges based on ethnic cleansing against Myanmar government
and security officials for their acts and omissions involving the Rohingya
Muslims.73 Charges of genocide are also a possibility if sufficient
evidence of the special intent can be demonstrated.
B. Crimes Against Humanity
First mentioned in connection with the acts perpetrated against
Armenians by the Ottoman Empire beginning in 1915, crimes against
humanity was one of the three categories of crimes prosecuted at the
International Military Tribunal (“IMT”) in Nuremberg, Germany, after
70. Id. ¶ 1.
71. Id. ¶¶ 1, 3. The principle of the responsibility to protect developed in the early 2000s
specifically in response to the failure of the international community to prevent atrocities including
genocide in the Balkans and Rwanda, as well as the controversial NATO military intervention in
Kosovo in 1999 to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe there, which was considered by many to be
an unlawful use of force. The principle is enshrined in a number of documents, including the 2005
World Summit Outcome, in which the UN General Assembly adopted language stating that “[e]ach
individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity” and that “[t]he international community, through the
United Nations, also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, to help protect populations
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.” G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138,
139, 2005 World Summit Outcome (Sept. 16, 2005).
72. Id. ¶¶ 5, 9-30; see also Schabas, supra note 53, ¶ 21.
73. In the international context, such charges would be brought under the heading of crimes
against humanity. See Schabas, supra note 53, ¶ 21 (noting that acts constituting ethnic cleansing
which did not meet the definition of genocide “would be condemned as crimes against humanity”).
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World War II. It is one of the crimes over which the ICTY—which
probably contributed the most to its modern development and
understanding—and ICTR had jurisdiction, and it can be prosecuted at
the ICC. The fundamental animating idea behind crimes against humanity
is that “certain crimes shock the conscience of all nations and of
humankind as a whole.”74 Even in the context of armed conflict, “some
elementary principles of humanity should be adhered to in all
circumstances”; when those principles are defied with sufficient gravity,
criminal sanctions are warranted.75
Unlike genocide, crimes against humanity does not have one single,
agreed-upon definition. The IMT Charter listed the following as
constitutive elements of the crime:
[M]urder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or
during the war; or persecutions on political, racial, or religious
grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic
law of the country where perpetrated.76

One of the major contributions of this definition is that it allows
prosecution based on acts perpetrated against a state’s own nationals—an
innovation in international law that is “closely associated” with the
development of international human rights law in the post-war period.77
Additionally, it is focused on protection of the civilian population, as
opposed to the combatants in an armed conflict.
Since Nuremberg, the general features of crimes against humanity
have crystallized into a number of key principles. First, there does not
need to be any nexus with an armed conflict. Crimes against humanity
may be committed in times of war or in times of peace.78 Second, the
constitutive crimes “must be committed as part of a widespread or
systematic attack against the civilian population, that is a large-scale or
organized attack the primary object of which is a civilian population.” 79
74. Guido Acquaviva & Fausto Pocar, Crimes Against Humanity, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 1 (2008).
75. Id. ¶¶ 1-2.
76. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, art. 6(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82
U.N.T.S. 279.
77. See Acquaviva & Pocar, supra note 74, ¶ 11.
78. Id. at ¶ 13; see also Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 141-42 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995).
79. See Acquaviva & Pocar, supra note 74, ¶ 14 (emphasis added); see also Prosecutor v.
Blaškić, IT-95-14, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 103-16 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July
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Thus, not every instance of violence will amount to crimes against
humanity; the crimes cannot be isolated and must involve “the
commission of multiple acts rising to the same level of gravity as the
enumerated inhumane acts.”80 Third, unlike genocide, crimes against
humanity does not require any special intent. The perpetrator must have
knowledge of the attack, though he or she need not share the same
purpose.81
The acts that constitute crimes against humanity have also expanded
in recent years and vary somewhat from tribunal to tribunal. In addition
to the acts prosecuted at Nuremberg (murder, extermination,
enslavement, deportation, persecution, and other inhumane acts), the ICC
also recognizes imprisonment or other severe deprivations of physical
liberty, such as torture, rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced
pregnancy, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of
comparable gravity, enforced disappearance of persons, and apartheid, to
be in violation of fundamental rules of international law. 82 The ICC also
expanded the grounds on which persecution may be committed, including
“any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic,
cultural, religious, gender . . . , or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law.” 83
Of these crimes, the three that appear most emblematic of the
violence inflicted upon the Rohingya Muslims in the autumn of 2017 are
deportation or forcible transfer, persecution, and rape or other sexual
violence. In the ICC’s definition, deportation or forcible transfer of
population means “forced displacement of the persons concerned by
expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which they are lawfully
present, without grounds permitted under international law.”84 The
deportations may, but need not, result in the transfer of a population
across an international border.85 In the case of the Rohingya, the forced
displacement of nearly a million people from their homes in Rakhine,
29, 2004) (holding the presence of individual combatants within the civilian population does not
change its status); see also Prosecutor v. Martić, IT-95-11-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 313 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 8, 2008) (holding that soldiers who are not capable of taking
part in hostilities may also be the target of crimes against humanity).
80. See Acquaviva & Pocar, supra note 74, ¶ 14; see also Blaškić, IT-95-14, ¶¶ 135-39; see
also Prosecutor v. Kunarac, IT-96-23-A & 96-23-1-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 100 (Int’l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002).
81. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(1); see also Kunarac, IT-96-23-A, ¶ 103.
82. Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(1)(a)-(k).
83. Id., art. 7(1)(h).
84. Id. art. 7(2)(d).
85. See Prosecutor v. Stakić, IT-97-24-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶¶ 276-308 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 22, 2006).
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both within Myanmar and to Bangladesh and other Southeast Asian
nations, even before the events of 2017, has been termed “the highest
outflow of asylum seekers by sea since the U.S. war in Vietnam.”86 The
Rohingya were driven out of their homes and villages en masse, forced
to flee from widespread arson, murder, torture, and abduction perpetrated
by Burmese government security forces and militia in a targeted
campaign of violence.87
Persecution is defined as “the intentional and severe deprivation of
fundamental rights contrary to international law by reason of the identity
of the group or collectivity.”88 It is therefore fundamentally concerned
with unlawful discrimination that denies a “fundamental human right laid
down in international law,” and as such may be the best means of
capturing the phenomenon of ethnic cleansing.89 There is a wide range of
underlying acts that may constitute persecution (including denial of
freedom of movement, denial of employment, denial of the right to
judicial process, denial of equal access to public services, and hate
speech), as long as the acts are of the same gravity as the other crimes
listed as crimes against humanity.90 It is not the cruelty of the acts as much
as the discriminatory intent that characterizes persecution.91 As noted by
the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the situation with respect
to the Rohingya—who were singled out for all manner of discriminatory
treatment on the basis of their ethnic, linguistic, and religious differences
from the majority of Burmese in Rakhine state—”seems a textbook
example of ethnic cleansing.”92 Widespread rape and other forms of
sexual violence have also been major features of the campaign against
the Rohingya.93
Thus, though any analysis is necessarily preliminary, based on the
reports of alleged acts committed to date, it seems extremely likely that a
number of crimes against humanity have been perpetrated against the
86. ASEAN PARLIAMENTARIANS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 37.
87. See Ratcliffe, supra note 4; see also Ramzy, supra note 2; see also HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 6, at 2.
88. Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 7(1).
89. Acquaviva & Pocar, supra note 74, ¶ 16; see also Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, IT-97-25-A,
Appeal Judgment, ¶ 185 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003).
90. Acquaviva & Pocar, supra note 74, ¶ 16.
91. Id.
92. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, High Comm’r for Human Rights, U.N. Human Rights Council,
Opening Statement before 36th Session (Sept. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Al Hussein Opening
Statement].
93. See, e.g., Kristen Gelineau, Rohingya Methodically Raped by Myanmar’s Armed Forces,
AP NEWS (Dec. 11, 2017), https://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/rohingya-methodically-rapedmyanmars-armed-forces; Secretary-General’s Sexual Violence Report, ¶¶ 55-57.
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Rohingya—most prominently deportation or forcible transfer,
persecution, and numerous forms of rape or other sexual violence.
C. War Crimes
The third major form of international crime is war crimes. A strict
interpretation of the term is “any act, or omission, committed in an armed
conflict that constitutes a serious violation of the laws and customs of
international humanitarian law and has been criminalized by international
treaty or customary law.”94 Thus, in order to constitute war crimes as an
international crime imposing liability on an individual perpetrator, the act
or omission must violate the primary rules governing the conduct of war
as well as the “secondary rules concerning the punishment of war
crimes.”95 Though the content of such primary rules may change from
time to time, it is generally the case that war crimes encompass grave
breaches of the four Geneva Conventions established after World War II
(and at least some of the grave breaches identified in Additional Protocol
I to the Geneva Conventions), serious violations of customary
international law governing armed conflict, including Article 3 common
to the Geneva Conventions (“Common Article 3”),96 violations of “other
general principles and rules of the protection of victims of internal armed
conflict,” and breaches of “certain fundamental principles and rules
regarding means and methods of combat in civil strife.”97
The complicating factor with respect to the Rohingya is the
threshold requirement of a nexus with an armed conflict. “[A]cts
unconnected to an armed conflict are not considered to be war crimes.”98
While the armed conflict need not have caused commission of the crime,
it must have “played a substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to
commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for which
it was committed.”99
Whether an armed conflict existed in Myanmar at the time the acts
were perpetrated against the Rohingya is a complicated factual question.
94. Alexander Schwarz, War Crimes, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW ¶ 1 (2014).
95. Id., ¶ 2.
96. The text of Article 3 of each of the four Geneva Conventions is identical. See, e.g., Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, art. 3, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter “Geneva Convention IV”].
97. Schwarz, supra note 94, ¶¶ 9-12.
98. Id., ¶ 23; see also Prosecutor v. Mucić, IT-96-21-T, Judgment, ¶ 193 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); Prosecutor v. Semanza, ICTR-97-20-A, Judgment, ¶ 369
(May 20, 2005).
99. Schwarz, supra note 94, ¶ 25; Kunarac, IT-96-23-A & 96-23-1-A,¶ 58.
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In international law, an armed conflict may be either international (i.e.,
involving two or more states) or non-international. There was no
international armed conflict between Myanmar and another state at issue
at the time of the violence perpetrated against the Rohingya. Thus, in
order to meet the nexus with armed conflict required for war crimes
charges to apply, the relevant acts must have been committed in the
context of a non-international conflict.100
According to Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, a
non-international armed conflict is a conflict between a state’s armed
forces “and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of
[the state’s] territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and
concerted military operations.”101 It does not include “situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic
acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature.”102 Thus, the conflict
must have reached a certain level of intensity, and the parties to it—on
all sides—must have developed and maintained a certain degree of
organizational control, in order to be characterized as a non-international
armed conflict.
At least one source has characterized the scale of tensions in
Rakhine state as an armed insurgency with a high-level intensity of
violence rising to the level of a non-international conflict.103 There
certainly is some evidence that the ARSA group of Rohingya militants
displays the requisite characteristics of organizational command and
control, preparation, and military training, with sufficiently large
numbers of members, to fall within Additional Protocol II’s definition of
an organized group—though key international groups such as the
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) appear to have
remained silent on the question.104 If that is the case, and the events of
autumn 2017 can properly be characterized as one episode in a “sustained
and concerted military operation,” rather than an “isolated and sporadic
act of violence,” then it may well be the case that war crimes charges
100. It is now well-established that Common Article 3, at minimum, applies to both
international and non-international armed conflicts. See Schwarz, supra note 94, ¶ 29; see also
Tadić, IT-94-1-AR72, ¶¶ 126-32.
101. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, art. 1(1), June 8, 1997, 1125
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
102. Id. art. 1(2).
103. See LAURA BARON-MENDOZA, THE WAR REPORT 2017: MYANMAR: A BATTLE FOR
RECOGNITION 4-5 (2017).
104. See id. at 5.
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could apply to any alleged perpetrator with a sufficiently strong link to a
party to the conflict—including non-state belligerent actors from the
Rohingya side, such as the commanders and leaders of ARSA.105
Though the list of potential war crimes is very long, many prohibited
acts revolve around violations of the basic principles of distinction
(distinguishing civilians from lawful military targets), proportionality,
and necessity, as well as the protection of prisoners of war or those placed
hors de combat (i.e., persons taking no active part in the hostilities,
including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and
those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other
cause).106 Given the horrific acts of which Burmese military and security
forces have been accused, which appeared to target civilians largely if not
exclusively, and dramatically escalated the violence in relation to the
threat presented, it is not a stretch to conclude that numerous war crimes
have been committed.
IV. CONCLUSION
The list of alleged bad acts perpetrated against Rohingya Muslims
in autumn 2017 is long and gruesome, and such acts appear to have been
undertaken systematically while targeting the entire Rohingya Muslim
population. There is little doubt that serious international crimes have
occurred, and may still be occurring, with respect to the Rohingya. Such
crimes would certainly include crimes against humanity (including acts
constituting ethnic cleansing) in the form of murder, extermination,
deportation or forcible transfer of population, imprisonment or other
severe deprivation of physical liberty, torture, rape and multiple forms of
sexual violence, persecution, enforced disappearances, and other
inhumane acts. It is less clear, without a full investigation and analysis of
the facts and evidence, whether genocide and war crimes have also been
committed—though the possibility does not seem unlikely. At least one
prominent voice has already called for the situation to be referred to the
ICC for investigation and potential prosecution.107 Let us hope that,
regardless of where or how, a full accounting of the atrocities takes place
and any perpetrators are brought to justice.

105. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 101, art. 1(2); see also Geneva Convention IV,
supra note 96, art. 3 (stating that Common Article 3 applies, by its own terms, “[i]n the case of
armed conflict not of an international character” to “each Party to the conflict,” and requires all the
parties to adhere to certain minimum standards of behavior and due process).
106. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 8(2); see also Schwarz, supra note 94, ¶ 42.
107. See Miles & Nebehay, supra note 14.

